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SPEECH  BY  THE  RT.  HON.  SIR  CHRISTOPHER  SOAMES, 
VICE-PRESIDENT  OF  THE  CO:t-'IMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES, 
AT  A MEETING  ARRAI.'JGED  BY  THE  EUROPEAN  MOV~~ENT IN  NORWAY  AT 
THE  NOBEL  INSTITUTE,  OSLO,  AT  7pm  on  3  NOVEMBER  1975._ 
* 
(DELIVERED  ON  BEHALF  OF  THE  RT.  HON.  SIR  CHRISTOPHER  SOAMES 
BY  MR  E~~D  WELLENSTEIN,  DIRECTOR-GENERAL  FOR  EXTERNAL  RELATIONS, 
COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMML~ITIES.) Mr  Chairman, 
May  I  begin by  thanking you  and your organisation for 
inviting me  to visit Norway,- and for  the kind words  you have 
said about me  by way  of introduction. 
My  work in Brussels is mainly concerned,  as  you remc::.rked, 
Mr  Chairman,  with  the external relations of the  Connnunity.  This1 
is the  theme  that  I  should like to  take  as  my  subject this 
evening. 
It is a  theme which is naturally of interest to you here 
in Norway,  situated as  you  are on our northern doorstep  and 
enjoying a  free trade relationship with the  Community.  And  it 
is a  subject in which it is understandable that the European 
Movement  should take a  close interest.  For  the  Connnunity  has 
been making  significant, if not always  widely noticed,  advances 
in the development of its external  relations  over the past 
three .,years • 
.  •.  ' ...  -~ ....  · . . .  * 
* 
There has in fact been a  contrast between  this progress 
on the external front and  the  slow pace we  have experienced 
recently in the European ·Community's  internal  development  - in 
spite of some  successes  we  have  registered,  for instance in the 
establishment of a  Community  regional policy.  And  the  se?.Ge 
contrast exists between the public  image  of the  Community  ~ong 
our  own  peoples  and  the view  of  the  Community  from  the  outside. 
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Within  the. Community  there is at present a  certain poverty 
of European  expectations which is in itself in part an extension 
of a  similar phenomenon  throughout  the western world. 
The  progress we  have-been able  to make  externally can be 
partly attributed to the fact that our peoples  are aspiring to 
find  a  new  role in world affairs which  draws  on the best of our 
previous  experience but which puts  behind us  the errors  v~hich 
culminated in two  world wars.  This  is pointing us  towards  a 
larger cooperation and  a  pooling of our efforts.  But  this is not 
the whole  story.  It'is in the nature  of international affairs 
that a  new  entity of the size. end  economic weight  of  the  Community 
should be under constant pressure to develop  a  coherent external 
policy.  Countries all over the world want  to define their own 
relations with it.  They  look to it, sometimes  with hope,  some-
times with trepidation to make  clear its policies  and  purposes. 
Indeed in the world  out::.ide  there is no  doubt  about the intense 
·  interest and  the hopes  which  the development  of the  Community  •  • 
inspires.  The most  striking recent example  of this trend was 
the decision of the  Peopl~s Republic  of  China to establish 
official relations with the  Community. 
For there is no  question that the European  Community  has 
become  a  considerable factor in world affairs;  and in this 
respect its enlargement  three years  ago marked much  more  than 
a  merely quantitative change,  although  the quantitative analysis 
is impressive enough.  The  Community  of the  Nine  has  a  gross 
national product that does  not fall far  short of that of  the 
United States.  Its population is greater,  and its production 
of many  key manufactures  is second  to none.  Our  member  states 
together transact 40  per cent of the  free world's  trade.  They 
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hold some  30  per cent of the world's  currency reserves.  They 
are the source of over 40  per cent of official development 
assistance to the Third World,  and  they provide a  large 
proportion of the private investment and  new  technology by 
which the developing countries set such store.  And  to many 
nations,  both developing  and developed,  the Community is their 
most  important export market  for  raw materials,  for  food  and 
for industrial goods. 
So  the world has  been looking to us  to make  clear our 
intentions.  And  for our part we  have  been mindful  of the great 
responsibility which the  Community's  economic  power  carries with 
it: responsibility to be understanding and imaginative in our 
trading policies,  responsibility to  those less well off than 
ourselves,  responsibility indeed in the conduct of some  of what 
may  seem at first sight simply to be  our internal policies  - on 
agriculture,  on textiles  and such like - but which  inevitably 
have a.:w.ider  impact upon other economies  around  the world. 
*  * 
* 
These are the challenges.  The  Community's  response 
follows  two  distinct but inter-related lines  of development. 
On  one  side there is the common  external  economic  policy 
operated by  the common  institutions of the  Community.  And  on 
the other there is  the system of foreign policy coordination or 
"political cooperation" operated by  the  governments  of the 
member  states acting in concert. 
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Take first the  common  external  economic  policy.  Its 
twin objectives are clearly set out in the preamble of the 
Treaty of Rome.  The  Community,  it says, 
"desires to contribute,  by means  of a  common  commercial 
policy,  to the progressive abolition of restrictions 
on  international trade". 
And  it then goes  on to say that the  Community 
"intends  to confirm  the solidarity \-Jhich  binds  Europe 
and  the overseas  countries,  and desires  ~o ensure  the 
development  ~f their prosperity,  in accordance with 
the principles  of the Charter of the United Nations". 
In the field of international trade policy our philosophy 
is simple,  and it is  founded upon experience.  The  road we  are 
following is that which  goes  by way  of developing,  extending and 
adapting the multilateral open  trade and payments  system based 
on internationally_agreed disciplines which has  served the whole 
world so well since the war  - and  the lack of which served it so 
ill in the  pre-war period.  Our  determination to maintain and 
extend the  achievements  of the European Free Trade Association 
when  the  Community was  enlarged is one  instance of our commit-
ment  to an  open world economy.  Our  active role first in the 
Kennedy  Round  and now  in the Multilateral Trade  Negotiations in 
Geneva is another. 
These negotiations resulted from  a  joint initiative by 
the United States  and the  Community.  They  are of capital 
importance  to us  all.  And  although  the present global  economic 
climate is not making  for rapid decisions  in the talks at Geneva, 
we  are determined to see  them  through  to  a  successful issue. 
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But  an  open world economy  is not  just one in 'tvhich  the 
trade barriers between the industrialised countries  are  reduced: 
it is  an  economy in which the whole  sum  of the world's  resources 
is actively and progressively engaged.  Everywhere in the 
developing world there are unemployed  and underemployed 
resources  - human  as well  as  physical  - waiting to make  their 
contribution to the progress  of mankind.  It would be wasteful,. 
both spiritually and materially,  not to develop  these resources 
-·  and at the  same  time we  must  recognise the right of the 
developing countries  themselves  to an equal voice in this process. 
Up  till now  the  Community's  policy towards  the developing 
countries has  been based on  two main instruments  - the Lome 
Convention and the Generalised  Scheme  of Preferences.  The  fact 
that the Lome  Agreement is not confined merely to Africa and 
that it extends  to 46  rather than  18 states means  that it is 
very much  more extensive in its geographical coverage than the 
Yaounde  agreements  which preceded it.  But  Lome  is more  than 
Yaounde writ large  •.... ,.It _is  an agreement  of a  quite different  ..  ~  .......  . 
nature.  In fact it sets out to do  no .less  than 
"to establish a  new  model  for  ..  ;.f!elation~· between 
developed and developing states,  compatible with the 
aspirations  of the international community  to a  more 
just and more  balar:tced  economic  order". 
Its provisions  concerning trade and financial  and industrial 
cooperation  ar~ expressions  of that ambition.  And  its arrange-
ments  for stabilising the export receipts  for  a  dozen basic 
commodities  - the  STABEX  Scheme  - are acknowledged  as  a  major 
·innovation in the relations  betw~~fi the industrial world and 
the developing countries. 
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STABEX  is  one  pioneering venture launched by the 
Community.  Our  Generalised Scheme  of Preferences is another. 
When  we  introduced it in 1971  we  were  the first major  trading 
community  to implement  such  a  scheme.  Each year since then we 
have  extended its  coverage,~and this year it is estimated as 
covering potentially more  than 20  billion Norwegian krone of 
our imports.  Annual  reviews  and  improvements  are built into 
our scheme,  important trade promotion efforts are associated 
with it, and earlier this year we  decided to continue it into 
i 
the 1980's  beyond  the ten year period which was  at first 
foreseen  by Unctad. 'In all this we  believe we  have given a 
lead and  have created an instrument which will prove to be of 
great and increasing value  to the developing world as  its 
industrialisation proceeds  over the years  ahead. 
*  * 
·····. 
* 
The  Common  Commercial  Policy, multilateral  trade 
negot'iations,  bilaterai commercial  cooperation,  the Lome 
agreement,  STABEX,  the Generalised Preference  Scheme:  all these 
are the direct responsibility of the  Community  institutions.  In 
a  phrase,  this is  "common  action through common  institutions". 
By  contrast,  the phrase which  s1~s up  the other element in our 
external  relations  - political cooperation bebveen  the member 
states  - is "joint action through  the coordination of national 
policies". 
Less  tersely defined,  political cooperation is the 
Community's  member  governments  coordinating their foreign 
policies  on  those international  questions  which fall outside 
the area  of  the  Community's  direct responsibility. 
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The  system of political cooperation only began in 1970; 
so it is relatively new.  So  far the record has  been somewhat 
patchy,  but we  have  registered substantial progress in three 
important directions. 
We  have set up  a  complex network of working relations 
at every  level~  and we  are now  beginning to see something of a 
convergence in the attitudes  and analyses  of the foreign 
ministries of the  Community.  Their operational procedures are 
being coordinated,  and  the machinery exists for arriving at a 
common  view.  Behind.this,  by building up  the habits of 
cooperation we  are already seeing the emergence of a  common 
attitude.  I  don't think we  should underestimate  the long-term 
practical importance of these psychological  changes  in 
organisations and attitudes which have  traditionally been 
animated more  by the spirit of national rivalry than by the 
spirit of international partnership. 
At  the same  time the Community  has  begun to learn some-
thing of the difficult arts of  joint crisis management.  To  give 
only three examples:  one  of our first ventures  in this field was 
the joint statement  on  the Middle East which we  agreed at 
Copenhagen in November  1973.  Over  the past year we  have  been 
speaking with one voice over  Cyprus.  And  now  we  have  developed 
a  response to the crisis in Portugal.  Coordination of response 
has  at least now  become  the rule rather than the exception. 
The  Corrimunity's  system of political cooperation has  also 
been making progress  in a  third direction.  We  are now 
developing the machinery we  need to enable the Community's 
member  states to take  a  single position or ·to speak with a  single 
voice in international discussions of·a political character- for 
example at the United Nations. 
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But  of course it would  be nonsense  to suggest that the 
areas which  the system ·of political cooperation covers  can be 
sharply distinguished from  those for which  the  Community 
institutions  themselves  are directly responsible.  One  of the 
most  interesting of the recent developments  in the Community's 
external  relations has  been the progressive interweaving of 
these  two  systems  and  the  abandonment of the somewhat artificial 
separation  .which was  imposed in the early years  of political 
cooperation. 
The  fact is that in many  areas of external relations  the 
common  institutions  and  the member  states are simply dealing 
with different but inseparable aspects  of· the same  problems. 
In these hybrid situations it is in practice impossible to 
operate the  t~o systems  as if they were hermetically sealed off 
one  from  the other.  We  have  had to learn how  to work  them 
together in a  single harness,  and over the past two years we 
have had a  good  deal  of worthwhile experience of this.  In some 
instances  - our position in the  Law  of  the  Sea  Conference is a 
case in point - we  have not yet had the success we  would like. 
But on many  important  questions  t·Je  have  done better than might 
have  been expected - especially in the long and  complex 
negotiations which preceded the Helsinki  summit  Conference  on 
Security and Cooperation,  and in the conduct of the Euro-Arab 
dialogue. 
The  effective indivisibility of the  two  sides of our 
external  relations \vas  recognised ·in  the decision last year to 
hold regular thrice-yearly meetings  of the  Co~uunity's heads 
of government in the European  Council at which all topics 
regardless  of their institutional nature  can come  up  for 
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discussion.  There is of course no  question of the  Co.tt._u~ity's 
common  commercial and  development policies now  passing  ~ut of 
the control of Community  institutions.  But it is  beco~ng 
increasingly clear that the establishment of the  Europecn 
Council  of heads  of government  and  the consequent changes  ,..;'hic'h 
are being reflected downwards  to the  Council  of Ministers  ~re 
beginning to provide  a  flexible  framework within  ~iclt purely 
foreign policy questions  and  questions  of trade and  develop~ent 
policy can be discussed together - as it is right that they 
should be. 
*  * 
* 
So  much  for the record.  But in this life nothi~g stands 
still.  On  every side new  and more  exacting questions  are being 
pressed upon us,  and the philosophy and practice of Europe's 
external relations are being shaped on the anvil  of  circU2stE~ce. 
Perhaps  the most  important of all the challenges thet 
f  .  faces  the  Community is that of creating and tending a  rel£ti~­
ship of confidence and cooperation with the United States  and 
Japan and the other developed industrial open-market societies. 
Cooperation in maintaining and  improving the multilateral 
framework  of an open world  economy  is only a  part - alth~ugh a 
crucial part - of the story.  The  fact is that the mutual 
interpenetration and interdependence of our economies  has  now 
reached such a  point that we  must also foster the  gr~7th of 
'  direct and regular bilateral contacts 'tvith  each other.  Tt:is  is 
the only way  in which we  can hope  to resolve the inevitable 
frictions. which arise between us:  only then can vJe  be  the r:..asters 
of events  andnot their slaves.  In all this  the  Commissio~ is 
seeking to make its contribution through the periodic  infor.=cl 
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consultations it has  developed \·lith  the United States,  Japan, 
Canada,  Australia and  New  Zealand. 
Good  relations  between the industrialised countries were 
the foundation of the prosperity of the post-war world,  and 
they are still of the highest importance.·  But  the future 
health and prospects  of the world economy,  and  the  Community's 
economy  along with it, depend  every bit as much  upon  good 
relations  between the industrialised countries  and  the 
developing nations  of the Third World.  So  the  Community will 
make  its  contributi~n at the United Nations,  in the Paris 
dialogue and in next year's  UNCTAD  Conference,  to build a  new 
consensus  in world  economic affairs.  We  envisage  a  ne-tv 
consensus  which meets  the  justified claims  of the developing 
countries  to a  voice in the management  and  growth of the world 
economy  and which can be  supported by the industrialised 
countries. 
As  the Community's  economic  integration develops it 
presents us with another  challeng~·ih our foreign relations. 
We  need to create instruments  capable of organising the  economic 
relations of the  Community  as  a  whole  - including the full 
range of its industrial and technological potential  - and 
fitting them to our own  future  requirements  and  to those of 
our partners abroad.  It is this  that has  led us  to question 
the old  orthodo~cy that external commercial policy belonged with 
the  Community:but  economic  cooperation was  the exclusive 
preserve of the member  states.  We  are trying to find  an 
adequate response  to the need to create an entirely ne\v 
relationship with countries  as  diverse as  Canada  and  Iran, 
and it is now  quite clear that over and  above  the bilateral 
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economic  cooperation arrangements  which exist between our 
member  states and  these countries.- arrangements  which must 
certainly continue - we  must also develop  a  Community  dimension 
to that cooperation. 
Then within the bounds  of Europe itself we  face  two 
formidable  challenges.  On  our  southern flank a  n~~ber of 
countries  are looking to us  for assistance,  for an ever closer 
degree  of cooperation ~nd, in one case,  for full partnership in 
the  Community.  Each  of these countries  has  made it clear that 
it considers  its relationship with the  Community  to be  a  key  to 
its economic  future.  Indeed in some  of them it is also 
considered to be  an important element in their future political 
orientation and stability - a  way  of consolidating the achieve-
ment  of their aspirations  towards  that system of pluralist 
democracy which is the basis  of our  own  societies.  It will not 
always  be easy to find the right response to these manifold 
claims upon our economic  and political support.  But we  know 
4  · ·· ·that  :w·e  owe it to our fellmv Europeans  .. ·- who  are placing such 
hope  and confidence in us  - to do  everything we  can to find 
that response. 
In our relations with our Eastern neighbours  the problem 
is different but the challenge is none  the less  real.  By  its 
signature of the Helsinki  Summit  declaration the  Community  as 
such is firmly committed to working for increased economic 
cooperation  be~1een the Eastern and  the Western halves  of our 
continent.  We  are ready to live up  to that commitment,  and we 
have  already made  known  our willingness  to negotiate trade 
agreements with the countries  of Eastern Europe  on  a  new 
Community-wide basis.  Already,  before Helsinki,  in February 
/of this year 
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of this year we  had  exploratory conversations  ~vith  CONECON 
at their invitation in Moscow.  We  in the  Conunission  stand 
ready at any moment  to continue these  exploratory contacts, 
contacts  to whose  continuation we!invited our partners at the 
1time of the first talks. 
*  * 
* 
Relations within the industrialised world,  relations 
between the rich North  and  the poor  South,  relations with our 
neighbours  in the Nediterranean and Eastern Europe:  such is 
the crowded  agenda which  is/moulding  the  Community's 
external policy.  What  lesson can we  draw  from  our experience 
so far? 
There is,  I  believe,  one lesson that runs  through  the 
whole  complex of the  Conmrunity's  external relations  - whether 
we  are thinking of the experience of the  Community's 
institutions operating in the area of their direct responsibility, 
.or whether·: we  are thinking _of  our experience in the looser frame-
work of political cooperation.  It is that in  t~e Community  our 
member  states have  found  a  more effective way  of carrying out 
their international. responsibilities  and of furthering their 
interests  than would ever have  been available to  them  on their 
own  in the modern world. 
None  of our member  states  could hope  to speak,  as  the 
Community  is pow speaking,  on  a  footing of equality in its 
commercial  and economic  relations .with the United States.  None 
of  them by  themselves  could have  made  the contribution through 
trade and aid assistance that Europe is now  making  to the 
development  of the Third World.  And  none of them  on  their O\o7n 
could aspire to be regarded,  as  the  Community  now  is,  as  a 
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valid option among  the three or four main  economic  forces  in 
the world. 
No  one of our member  states can achieve this  by  them-
\ 
selves.  But  because of the nature of the  Community  each is 
able to make  its own  distinctive contribution to the develop-
ment of its policies,  and each shares  the benefits which accrue 
to the whole. 
As  they look about  themselves at the confused and  ever 
more rapidly changing kaleidoscope of world events,  there is 
no  doubt in my  mind that the peoples  of Europe will recognise 
the growing presence and stature of their Community.  Then let 
their gaze turn inward for  a  moment,  so that they may  impart 
to the inner development  of the  Community  the  same  measure of 
hope  and confidence which is placed in it by  our friends  and 
allies in the world around us.  ~ 